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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH

CECELIA BEA SCAFIDE,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

*
*
*
*
*
*
*

vs.
JAMES WAYNE SCAFIDE,
Defendant/Appellant.

APPEALS NUMBER 930276-CA
Case Number 914903785 DA

BRIEF OF THE APPELLEE CECELIA BEA SCAFIDE
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this matter
pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2) (h) of the Utah Code Annotated 1953,
as amended and Rules of Appellate Procedure 3(a) and 4.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
In his opening brief, the Defendant, James Wayne Scafide,
presented the following two issues for review by the Court of
Appeals. The appropriate standard of review is stated below for
each issue.

1. Error in Not Granting the Defendant Relief from the
Judament and Decree of Divorce. The trial court's determination
that a party is not entitled to relief from a judgment will not be
upset on appeal absent a showing of abuse of discretion. Gardiner
1

& Gardiner Builders v. Swapp, 656 P.2d 429 (Utah 1982), Russell v.
Martelf 681 P. 2d 1193 (Utah 1984), Baker v. Western Surety Company,
757 P.2d 878 (Utah App. 1988) and Richins v. Delbert Chipman & Sons
Companyr 817 P.2d 382 ( Utah App. 1991).

2. Improper Application of the Time Limit Set Forth in Rule
60fbUl) through 60(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The
determinative standard for resolution of this issue is also an
abuse of discretion. The cases cited, Gardiner & Gardiner Builders
v. Swapp, Russel v. Martel, Baker v. Western Surety Company and
Richins v. Delbert Chipman & Sons Companyr infra. are authoritative
on this issue.

DETERMINATIVE RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
The interpretation of Rule 60(b)(1) through 60(b)(7) is also
believed to be determinative of the matter on appeal.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I. NATURE OF THE CASE
The Plaintiff Cecelia Scafide (nka Cecelia Coggins) filed for
a divorce from her husband on the grounds of irreconcilable
differences. The Defendant and the Plaintiff agreed upon all
relevant issues and the Defendant directed the Plaintiff to retain
counsel and obtain the dissolution of the marriage. The parties
entered

into

a

written

stipulation

and

property

settlement

agreement codifying the resolution of all issues incident to
2

divorce.
II. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
The parties also agreed to waive the ninety day waiting
period. The Defendant requested and obtained statements from his
health care providers justifying the waiver of the waiting period.
A default divorce hearing was held before the Honorable Frank Noel
on December 3, 1991. The Decree of Divorce was granted and became
final on December 3, 1991, approximately seventy eight days after
the complaint for divorce was filed.
On July 30, 1992 the Defendant filed a motion for relief from
judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b)(7) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
III. DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW
Judge Noel heard oral argument from the counsel for the
parties and then took the matter under advisement. On March 17,
1993 Judge Noel issued a Minute Entry denying the Defendant the
relief he sought.
IV. LODGING OF THIS APPEAL.
The Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal on April 14, 1993. On
April 23, 1993 the Plaintiff filed an Exception To Appeal Bond and
Motion to Dismiss Appeal. The Motion to Dismiss Appeal was denied.
That appeal is now before this Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Defendant has, in his opening brief, given a recitation of
facts he believes are accurate. Rather than reiterate what has been
previously sworn to and placed into evidence at the District Court
3

level and what has been recited to the Court of Appeals the
Plaintiff shall only correct misstatements made by the Defendant in
his

brief

and

shall

selectively

supplement

the

Defendant's

recounted facts where appropriate.
1. The written stipulation the Defendant now refers to as
"putative" was premised upon a written directive to the Plaintiff
which the Defendant voluntarily wrote, had notarized and then
presented to the Plaintiff. (Appendix A). The primary deviations
between this document and the subsequent written stipulation
executed by the parties are the Defendant's financial obligations
to the parties' children.
2. The Defendant misstates the content of the statements from
his health care providers. (Defendant's Appendix C ) . There is
nothing in either statement which indicates the "defendant suffered
from a mental illness or defect...". Rather these documents verify
that a suggestion was made to the Defendant to seek the assistance
of a mental health counselor to address his use of alcohol.
There is nothing in the record other than the Defendant's
self-serving, specious allegations that the "... defendant suffered
from a mental illness or defect and/or problems involving substance
abuse, such that he was incapable of entering a binding contract in
the autumn of 1991". The Defendant's health care providers made no
indication that the Defendant was ill-advised much less incapable
of handling his affairs or entering into a binding contract. In
fact no manifestations of alarm or concern were raised about the
Defendant's assertions to his health care providers that he was
4

divorcing or that his divorce was uncontested.
The Defendant's activities also negate any allegation that he
was too incapacitated to handle personal or business affairs. As
the Plaintiff stated in her affidavit in opposition to the request
for relief from judgment, the Defendant, sxibsequent to the filing
for divorce, represented himself at trial arising from a DUI arrest
in Moab, Utah which occurred in June 1991. He had also engaged in
numerous business activities despite his reliance upon alcohol as
an anesthetic. (Appendix B).
3. The Plaintiff refuted each and every "fact" cited by the
Defendant as grounds for relief from the Decree of Divorce in her
affidavit in opposition to the Defendant's motion. (Appendix B).
These factual denials include:
a. The Plaintiff never informed the Defendant the divorce was
an artifice to avoid any contingent liabilities resulting from an
automobile accident he had. Rather, the Defendant was adamant that
there be a divorce and that it be final before the end of the
calendar year as he was anticipating the receipt of a large
settlement from his Worker's Compensation claim which he wished to
retain as his sole and separate property. He wished the divorce
finalized before receipt of the anticipated monies to minimize his
tax liabilities and to claim sole ownership of his expected
remuneration.
b. The parties had effectively led separate lives for a
significant amount of time. The Plaintiff did not indicate to the
Defendant they would continue to be husband and wife.
5

c. The Plaintiff and Defendant did not continue to act as
husband and wife after the dissolution of their marriage. The
property in Colorado was purchased after the Defendant could not
qualify on his own to purchase the same and after he convinced the
Plaintiff to invest with him. The Plaintiff retained her married
name after the divorce. Thus, the real estate documents bear
identical surnames of the purchasers. However, identical surnames
are not an indicia of a marital relationship.
The Plaintiff did notify her employer that she was divorced.
She does not know why they still listed him as an insured party on
her medical insurance. However, after her job transfer to Colorado
in January 1992 the Plaintiff secured health insurance for her and
her children only.
The Plaintiff stated the Defendant was travelling most of the
time prior to the divorce and thereafter. He did store personal
property at her residence but they were not living together.
The Defendant refused to convey title of the vehicles to the
Plaintiff. ( In fact he still has yet to convey title or possession
of the Honda). When the Plaintiff relocated to Colorado she
obtained insurance on her vehicle for herself only.
The Plaintiff stated that the parties had joint personal
banking accounts as a matter of convenience during the marriage.
However, they each exclusively utilized separate accounts. The
Defendant continued to use the account he had used during the
marriage

after

December

1991.

The

Plaintiff

knew

she

was

relocating. She thought of one account as hers. This account was
6

closed after she moved. Thereafter she did not have a joint account
with the Defendant.
The Plaintiff signed her apartment lease when she relocated.
Only her signature is on the lease she negotiated. (Appendix C).
The Defendant later contacted her apartment complex' property
manager and placed his name on the Plaintiff's lease. The Court is
requested to compare the two copies of the lease which have been
submitted. As noted, the Plaintiff's name only appears on her copy.
The Defendant's lease verifies he executed the same after the date
the Plaintiff rented her apartment.

REBUTTAL TO SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion
for

relief

from

judgment.

There

are

no

extreme

facts

and

circumstances in this matter as alleged by the Defendant. The
Defendant's motion for relief and this appeal are nothing more than
an effort by the Defendant to manufacture reasons why he should not
be bound by the Decree of Divorce because he became disenchanted
with the bargain he made, an effort to manipulate the judicial
system and continuing harassment of the Plaintiff.
The Plaintiff has adamantly denied that there was any fraud
perpetrated by her either upon the Defendant or the Court. The
Plaintiff did seek a dissolution of her marriage in good faith. The
parties stipulated to an equitable division of their personal
property, real property and debts and resolved all other issues,
such as custody, child support and visitation, incident to divorce.
7

The Court approved their stipulation and granted their divorce.
As stated in Haner v. Haner. 373 P.2d 577 (Utah 1962) at pages
579 and 580:
"... It is plainly apparent here that there has been
no actual reconciliation, but the feud which existed
between the parties prior to, and during the divorce
trial continues. The purported reconciliation appears
at best only a forlorn hope of one of the parties, or
perhaps it is but another tactic in attempting to gain
economic advantage. It certainly does not represent a
realistic appraisal of the relationship between them."...
The Defendant's untrue claims of fraud upon him are knowingly
false

representations

designed

to

cast

the

Plaintiff

in an

undeserved defensive posture, to elicit undeserved sympathy for him
and to attempt to obtain relief to which he is clearly not
entitled.

The Defendant's untrue claims of fraud upon the Court

are unwarranted attempts to prejudice the Plaintiff7 standing with
the Court.
The Utah Supreme Court in Haner, infra, discussed the concept
of fraud in divorce matters. The Court, at pages 578 an 579 stated:
"However, inasmuch as the Plaintiff here seems to be
relying on the grounds of fraud there is a distinction
which is necessary to point out. In order to justify
granting relief, the alleged wrong would have to be of
the type characterized as extrinsic fraud: that is fraud
based on conduct or activities outside of the court
proceedings themselves;and which is designed and has
the effect of depriving the other party of the
opportunity to present his claim or defense. This type
of fraud, which is regarded as a fraud not only upon the
opponent, but upon the court itself, can be accomplished
in a number of ways, such as making false statements or
representations to the other party or to witnesses to
prevent them from contesting the issues; or by that
means or otherwise preventing the attendance of the
parties or witnesses; or by destroying or secreting
evidence; so that a fair trial of the issues is
8

effectively prevented."
Nothing the Plaintiff did constituted fraud as she did not
make any false statements or representations to the Defendant which
prevented him from contesting the evidence, nor did she destroy or
secret evidence. The Defendant identified the outcome he desired
well before the Plaintiff initiated the action for divorce and well
before the parties executed the written stipulation and property
settlement agreement. (Appendix A ) . Moreover, the Defendant was
informed of his right to seek legal representation and executed an
Acceptance of Service and Appearance indicating an understanding of
his rights. (Exhibit D to Appendix B). The Defendant voluntarily
affirmed the process he initiated. No fraud was ever perpetrated
upon him or the trial court by the Plaintiff.
However, assuming arguendo, that Plaintiff did perpetrate
fraud, either extrinsic or intrinsic, the Defendant was barred from
seeking relief pursuant to Rule 60(b)(3) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure after the expiration of three months from the date the
Decree of Divorce was entered. The sections of Rule 60(b) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which govern motions premised in
fraud are:
11

On motion and upon such terms as are just, the
court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a
party or his legal representative from a final judgment,
order or proceeding for the following reasons: ...
(3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or
extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an
adverse party.... (7).... The motion shall be made within
a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4),
not more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or
proceeding was entered or taken."....
9

The three month time limit imposed upon the bringing of a
motion for relief from judgment has been repeatedly upheld by the
appellate courts of this state. In St. Pierre v. Edmondsf 645 P.2d
615 (Utah 1982) at pages 617 and 618 the Utah Supreme Court held:
11

Rule 60(b) authorizes the trial court, on motion,
to relieve a party from a final judgment or decree
procured by fraud, whether intrinsic or extrinsic,
but only if the motion is made within three months
after the judgment. ...
Nonetheless, even when there is fraud in obtaining a
judgment, there must be some time limit on the bringing
of an action to set the judgment aside."...
The reasons for strict adherence to the three month time limit
are applicable to this case. As noted in Birch v. Birch, 771 P.2d
1114 ( Utah App. 1989), page 1117, there must be finality to
judgments. Citing Land v. Land, 605 P.2d 1248 (Utah 1980) the Court
stated:
11

(W)hen a decree is based upon a property settlement
agreement, forged by the parties and sanctioned by the
court,
equity
must
take
such
agreement
into
consideration. Equity is not available to reinstate
rights and privileges voluntarily contracted away
simply because one has come to regret the bargain
made. Accordingly, the law limits the continuing
jurisdiction of the court where a property
settlement agreement has been incorporated into the
decree and the outright abrogation of the provisions
of such an agreement is only to be resorted to with
great reluctance and for compelling reasons." ...
Categorically, there was no fraud perpetrated by the Plaintiff
upon either the Defendant or the Court. Judge Noel had no
authority to apply any time restriction other than the three month
time limit upon the Defendant/s motion for relief from judgment.
10

The decision denying the Defendant's motion for relief was legally
accurate and should not be disturbed upon appeal.
There is no medical testimony or evidence from a mental health
counselor that the Defendant suffered from any mental illness
immediately

prior

to

the

execution

of

the written

property

settlement agreement, the date the divorce was finalized or the
date the Defendant filed the motion for relief. If indeed the
Defendant

is

relying

upon

the

findings

which

granted

his

application for social security disability payments he has again
grossly misconstrued the same. The hearing officer found: "... At
the hearing, the medical expert testified
suffered

from a personality

that the claimant

disorder. He testified

that the

claimant' (sic) inflexible and maladaptive personality traits were
evidenced

by

pathologically

inappropriate

suspiciousness

or

hostility, oddities of thought, persistent disturbances of mood,
pathological dependence, passivity or aggressivity, and intense and
unstable personal relationships. The medical expert testified that
the claimant's disorder resulted in moderate restrictions of daily
living

activities, marked

difficulties

in maintaining

social

functioning, frequent deficiencies of concentration and continual
episodes of deterioration." In the words of the medical expert, who
testified on or about March 11, 1991 the Defendant's condition
resulted

in

only

moderate

restrictions

of

daily

living

activities.(Exhibit A to Defendant's Appendix B).
Neither the physician's assistant nor the medical doctor who
examined the Defendant in September 1991 and October 1991 indicated
11

that the Defendant was incapacitated and incapable of functioning
either because of alcohol abuse or mental illness. Their concerns
about the Defendant's use of alcohol to diminish his physical pain
are consistent with the noted moderate restriction in daily living
activities and frequencies of concentration due to inebriety.
However, neither the concerns of the health care providers employed
by FHP or the expert who testified at the disability claim hearing
indicated that the Defendant was incapacitated or debilitated by a
mental illness.
The Defendant has attempted to self-diagnose the condition
caused by his alcohol use, exaggerate the same and give selfserving

statements

regarding

his

alleged

mental

illness

and

incapacitation in an attempt to be relieved from the provisions of
the Decree of Divorce. The Defendant did not present credible
evidence

of

his

alleged

mental

illness.

His

erroneous

characterization of medical testimony given in a different tribunal
for a totally different purpose and the statements he obtained to
facilitate

waiver

of

substantiate

the

debilitating

mental

the

ninety

Defendant's

day

belief

waiting
that

he

period
suffers

do

not

from a

illness. The lower court was correct in

rejecting the Defendant's claimed incapacity.
The trial properly applied the provisions of Rule 60(b) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to the Defendant's motion for relief
from judgment. The Defendant was very much capable of negotiating
and stipulating to the terms of the divorce. He absolutely was in
control of his actions. The Defendant's motion for relief was
12

untimely.

The

lower

court

properly

recognized

its

inherent

inability to consider the Defendant's motion for relief from
judgment. This Court is respectfully requested not to disturb the
ruling of the lower court as the same is legally accurate and does
not constitute an abuse of discretion.
However, assuming arguendo. that the Defendant was suffering
from a mental illness the alleged mental condition would still not
entitle him to circumvent the three month time limitation imposed
by Rule 60(b)(7) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The
Defendant had been consuming alcohol as a surrogate pain killer for
many years. He had obviously had some type of psychological
examination as an expert testified at the disability claim hearing
regarding the Defendant's personality disorder. It should be noted
that the expert's testimony identified only a personality disorder,
which did not greatly impede or hinder the Defendant's ability to
function, and not a debilitating or incapacitating mental illness.
There is absolutely no way the Defendant could not be aware of
his health. Only he introduced alcohol into his system at the times
and places he selected. The parties have each indicated the
Defendant did exercise control in the use and abstention from
alcohol.
The Defendant acknowledged he was informed that he had the
right to have an attorney represent him. The fact that he had been
deemed physically disabled, utilized alcohol and had a personality
disorder were all known to him. He can not now claim that he may
have failed to act prudently to protect his rights and should have
13

been afforded the protection offered in Section 60(b) of the Utah
Rules

of

Civil

Procedure.

Some

of

the

recognizable

reasons

articulated in Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
particularly

mistake

and

inadvertence

and

arguably

excusable

neglect are applicable to the Defendant's situation. The holding of
the Utah Supreme Court in Pitts v. McLachlan, 567 P.2d 171 (Utah
1977) is controlling. Specifically, at pages 173 and 174, the Court
held:
" It seems inescapable, also# to conclude that Rule
60(b)(1) is applicable here in the letter and spirit
of rules governing procedure and practice and the
doctrine of the exercise of diligence in the
presentation of one's rights, failing which they are
amenable to a limitations statutory feature looking to
repose of litigation after a reasonable time, interdicted
here to be three months under Rule 60(b)(1). "
The Defendant asserts that because of his mental condition he
was unable to enter into a binding contract. This specious argument
confuses the issue of a void and a voidable contract. Assuming only
for the purpose of argument that the Defendant was inhibited
because of a mental condition any contract he entered into while
incapacitated may be capable of being voided. It is not, however,
ab initio, void. Had the Defendant desired to void the

property

settlement agreement and negate operation of the Decree of Divorce
he would have had to do so in a timely matter. The Court of Appeals
has held that a desire to be relieved from a stipulation because
one did not understand the consequences of the same is governed by
the three month time limitation. The Court stated in Richins v.
14

Delbert Chipman & Sons Company, 817 P.2d 382 (Ut. App. 1991) at
page 386:
" Chipman argues that Rule 60(b)(7), rather than (1)
applies to his case. However, we find that Chipman's
claim that he mistakenly entered into an ill-advised
stipulation without fully understanding its consequences
is correctly characterized as mistake, inadvertence,
surprise or neglect under Rule 60(b)(1). (citations
omitted). Therefore, the trial court was correct in
concluding that any relief sought under Rule 60(b) would
have to be pursuant to subsection (1)."
Clearly the three month time limitation applied to the
Defendant's motion for relief from judgment. The Defendant did not
act diligently to protect his rights. The trial court's denial of
the relief sought by the Defendant was proper. This Court should
affirm the decision of the lower court.

ARGUMENT

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO GRANT THE
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT
The Defendant's contention that "... Rule 60(b) specifically
recognizes that a party's fraud upon the court in obtaining
judgment may constitute a unique circumstance under which the court
may need to consider the party's conduct outside the other time
limits of Rule 60(b)." is clearly a misstatement of the law. Rule
60(b)(3) and Rule 60(b)(7) afford a party relief from judgment if
predicated upon fraud, either intrinsic or extrinsic, if the motion
15

for relief from judgment is brought "not more than three months
after the j udgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken." The
stated three month time limit is an absolute bar to an untimely
motion for relief from judgment, Haner v. Haner. 373 P.2d 577 (Utah
1962), Bovce v. Bovce. 609 P.2d 928 (Utah 1980) and St. Pierre v.
Edmonds. 645 P.2d 615 (Utah 1982).
Contrary to the assertion of the Defendant adherence to the
three month time limit from the date of the final order rather than
the date the party discovers the fraud does make sense. Allowing
the time limit to run as the Defendant would suggest as being
sensible would circumvent the stated time limitation

for no

justifiable reason, would allow multiple litigations and would
destroy

the

finality

of

judgments

and

the

doctrine

of

res

adiudicata. The Court in Boyce, infra, provides an excellent
discussion of the difficulties a motion for relief from judgment
presents. This case unfortunately demonstrates the realities faced
by a party who must not only endure the difficulty of the initial
proceedings but must suffer the economic, financial and emotional
hardships created by a second action initiated by the other party
to

the

action who

becomes

disgruntled, may

be

unreasonably

litigious or simply desires to harass the other party. In light of
the hardships and stress this Plaintiff has endured subsequent to
the filing of the motion for relief the strict adherence to a three
month time limitation is neither unreasonable nor unwarranted.
The Plaintiff

emphatically

and categorically

denies

she

perpetrated a fraud either upon the Court or the Defendant. As
16

verified in her affidavit and the documents submitted to the lower
Court the "facts" relied upon by the Defendant for the relief
requested in his Rule 60(b) motion were inaccurate. The allegations
were uttered with the intent to mislead the Court and to possibly
obtain relief to which he was not entitled. The lower Court,
however, did not have the

authority

or the jurisdiction to

adjudicate the credibility of the allegations as the parameters of
the applicable time limit in Rule 60(b)(7) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure precluded the same. Richins. supra. As is noted
elsewhere in Rule 60(b)(7) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and
controlling cases, such as St. Pierre v. Edmonds, supra. the bar
created by the three month time limit does not preclude a party
from bringing an independent action to modify the final judgment or
decree.
The lower Court correctly determined that the Defendant's
motion

for

relief

was

not

entitled

to

the

more

ambiguous

"reasonable" time limitation of Rule 60(b)(7) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure. The Defendant was precluded from application of
the arguably greater time within to bring a motion encompassed in
Rule

60(b)(7) of

the Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure

as the

provisions of Rule 60(b)l), 60(b)(2) and 60(b)(3) governed his
motion which was predicated upon allegations of fraud but in
actuality

constituted

avowals of negligence

and

lack of due

diligence. Richins v. Delbert Chipman & Sons Company, supra. In
Lincoln Benefit Life Insurance Company v. Southern Properties. 838
P. 2d 672

( Utah App. 1992) this Court upheld the standards
17

established in Laub v. South Central Utah Telephone Ass'n.. 657
P. 2d 1304 (Utah 1982) which a moving party must meet to be afforded
relief under equitable standards of Rule (60)(b)(7) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court stated, at pages 674 and 675:
"As the residuary clause of Rule 60(b), subsection (7)
embodies three requirements for relief: "First, that the
reason be one other than those listed in subdivisions (1)
through (6); second, that the reason justify relief; and
third, that the motion be made within a reasonable time."
(citations omitted) Subsection (7) "should be very
cautiously and sparingly invoked by the Court only in
unusual and exceptional instances", (citations omitted)
Furthermore, subsection (7) may not be employed for
relief when the grounds asserted are encompassed within
subsection (1). (citations omitted) Otherwise, the three
month time limitation for filing motions pursuant to
subsection (1) would be circumvented,
(citations omitted). "
The Defendant was clearly not entitled to application of the
more liberal provisions of Rule 60(b)(7) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure as he failed to meet any of the three conditions
precedent. The Defendant alleged fraud in his petition. Allegations
of fraud are clearly governed by Rule 60(b)(3) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure and the three month time limitation imposed in Rule
60(b)(7) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
The relief the Defendant was seeking was not justified. The
terms of the stipulation and the Decree of Divorce were neither
inequitable, contrary to the provisions of applicable statutes,
such as Section 30-3-5 of the Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended,
or unduly onerous to the Defendant. (Decree of Divorce, Appendix D
and Plaintiff's Affidavit in Opposition to Request for Relief from
Judgment, Appendix A.) The Defendant was not justified in seeking
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to be relieved from the terms of the agreement he knowingly and
voluntarily entered into or to alter or modify the same. Moreover,
to afford

relief

to the Defendant

as requested

would cause

unquantifiable unfairness and harm to the Plaintiff. The new life
she created as well as the stability and certainty created by and
enforceable because of the Decree of Divorce would be jeopardized
and possibly eradicated.
Finally, the motion was not made within a reasonable amount of
time. This motion was filed nearly eight months after the Decree of
Divorce was entered and nearly a year after the parties' final
separation. There have been numerous attempts by courts to define
"reasonable time". Admittedly, this is a subjective criteria.
However, in Laub, supra. and Peck v. Cook. 510 P.2d 530 (Utah 1973)
delays of more than six months from the date of the final order to
the date of the filing of the motion for relief from judgment were
deemed unreasonable. Certainly, this Plaintiff and other parties to
actions should be entitled to feel secure with their judgments as
soon as possible and practicable.
Issue

is taken with the Defendant's

statement

that the

Defendant filed his motion for relief from judgment within two
months after the "plaintiff finally revealed to him her scheme to
obtain the lion's share of the marital assets without dispute.
There certainly was no scheme, artifice, plan or fraudulent act by
the Plaintiff to obtain the lion's share of the marital assets. The
Defendant again has asserted an illusory, untrue belief as fact and
premised a fatally illogical argument upon the same. The Defendant
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can not claim to have filed a motion for relief within two months
after an event or series of events that never occurred. The
Defendant's motion was filed many, many, many months after the
Decree was entered. The delayed filing is unreasonable, even if the
Defendant were able to meet the other criteria for relief under
Rule 60(b)(7) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
The three time constraints of Rule 60(b)(7) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure have been repeatedly lauded as being necessary
to establish finality to the litigation. Lincoln, supra, Russell,
supra, and Laub, supra. As the Court stated in Laub, supra, at page
1308:
"The time strictures of Rule 60(b) are wholesome and
necessary, for there must be an end to the time when
judgments can be questioned, (citations omitted) "There
must be an end to litigation someday, and free,
calculated, deliberate choices are not to be relieved
from.") Furthermore, since subdivision (1) is applicable
to the instant case, subdivision (7) can not be used to
circumvent the three-month filing period,
(citations omitted). "
The Defendant appears to have sought relief pursuant to Rule
60(b)(7) in an effort to circumvent the three month time limitation
applicable to fraud and other enumerated grounds. However, refuge
in this section is not permissible when other sections of the rule
are applicable and controlling. Richins, supra, Calder Brothers
Company v. Anderson. 652 P.2d 922 (Utah 1982), Russell, supra,
Pitts, supra and Gardiner, supra.
Judge Noel in his minute entry also determined that the
Defendant's motion was not filed within a reasonable time even if
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the three month time limit did not apply. The ruling of the lower
court was not an abuse of discretion and should not be reversed by
this Court. Russell, supra and Baker, supra.

REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES

The Plaintiff respectfully requests this Court order the
Defendant to pay the costs and actual attorney fees she has
incurred herein. The Defendant filed the motion for relief from
judgment and this appeal in bad faith as he knew his allegations
were meretricious. The Defendant had vowed to make certain the
Plaintiff's financial security and peace of mind were destroyed.
The tenacious litigiousness of the Defendant has been costly to the
Plaintiff. She has been required to expend a considerable amount of
time, energy and effort to defend herself. The toll taken has been
substantial.

REQUEST FOR EXPEDITED RESOLDTION
The Plaintiff respectfully requests an expedited resolution of
this appeal. There is a balloon payment due on the rental property
she was awarded in the underlying divorce action. The Defendant did
has not sufficiently conveyed title to her so that she can either
sell the property or refinance the same. Moreover, the Defendant
has ben occupying the rental unit. The parties have not agreed on
how to address the upcoming balloon payment.
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CONCLDSION
This brief argues in detail that the trial court did not err
in refusing to grant the Defendant relief pursuant to any provision
of Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The rationale
for the lower Court's decision are adequately supported by the
affidavits and documents submitted to the Court and the record.
The Defendant failed to file his motion for relief within a
reasonable amount of time much less the applicable three month time
limit. The basis for the Defendant's motion were not so unusual or
compelling as to afford him the more liberal consideration afforded
in Rule 60(b)(7) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The
Plaintiff respectfully urges this Court to sustain the ruling of
the lower Court.

Respectfully submitted this fcxh day of December 1993.

Carolyn^Driscoll
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee
Cecelia Scafide

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
The undersigned hereby certifies that two copies of the
Plaintiff/Appellee's brief and two copies of the addendum were hand
delivered on the £th day of December 1993 to Mary Corporon, the
attorney for the Defendant/Appellant, 310 South Main Street, Suite
1400, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101.
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